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PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
This Court previousiy denied a Petition for Extraordinary Writ in this matter in 
Case No. 20000322 SC. That petition sought a stay of the trial date and an order 
allowing Snyder to conduct discovery. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2 (3)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY APPELLANT 
ON WHICH AMICUS WISHES TO BE HEARD 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting an expedited trial absent the posting of 
a possession bond pursuant to Utah Code § 78-36-8,5. 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
Amicus Crossroads Urban Center believes that the issues on which it wishes to be 
heard were properly raised below and adopts the appellants' record references on Issues 
## 1 and 2 of appellant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Amicus concurs in and adopts appellant's statement of the standard of review for 
issues ##1 and 2. The standard for denial of a request for continuance is abuse of 
discretion. Boice v. Marble, 982 P.2d 565 (Utah 1999) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an unlawful detainer action by the Housing Authority of the County of Salt 
Lake (hereinafter "Housing Authority") as landlord, against John Thomas Snyder 
(hereinafter " Snyder") as tenant. After setting an expedited trial over Snyder's 
objections and denying Snyder's motion for continuance filed on the eve of trial, the 
District Court terminated his tenancy, (R. 266), determined that Snyder was in unlawful 
detainer and awarded treble damages. (R. 267). The court granted the Housing Authority 
judgment in the amount of $8,687.20 and a writ of restitution. (R. 296). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The complaint in this unlawful detainer action was filed on March 6, 2000. (R. 1). 
2. On March 13, 2000, Snyder filed an answer. (R. 17). 
3. Snyder filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 20, 2000. (R. 24). 
4. On March 27, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss before Housing 
Authority responded. (R. 31). 
5. The Housing Authority filed a certificate of readiness for trial dated March 17, 
2000, four days after Snyder's answer was filed (R. 29). That certificate of 
readiness for trial stated that: 
• * * 
2. . . .; that opposing parties have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; 
* * * 
4. That reasonable discussions to attempt settlement have been pursued by 
counsel and their clients, but no settlement has been effected. (Such 
discussions are to be realistic in nature and not limited to nonresponse to an 
offer. The duty to effectively negotiate lies with all parties.) 
(R. 29-30). 
6. Snyder filed an objection to the Certificate of Readiness for Trial on March 20, 
2000 (R. 27). 
7. Snyder's objection to the Certificate of Readiness for Trial was based on the lack 
of opportunity for discovery or settlement discussions (R. 27). 
8. The trial court denied Snyder's objection to the certificate of Readiness for Trial 
on March 27, 2000 before the Housing Authority responded. (R. 31). 
9. On April 6, 2000, the Court set the matter for an expedited trial on May 8, 2000. 
10. On or about May 1, 2000, Snyder filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 229). 
11. On May 5, 2000, Housing Authority filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. ). 
12. On May 5, 2000, Snyder filed a motion for continuance (R. 153 ) 
13. At trial on May 8, 2000, defendant again moved for a continuance, because he 
had not been afforded the opportunity to engage in discovery, (Transcript, 10:14-
19) and objected to testimony by witnesses that had not been disclosed prior to 
trial. (Transcript, 34:12-17). 
14. The trial court denied the request for continuance and to disallow certain 
testimony. (Transcript, 10:20-22). 
15. The court found that Snyder was in unlawful detainer of the premises and awarded 
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treble damages. (Transcript, p. 102:16-24; Findings of Fact, K 9 (R. 267)). 
16. The court granted the Housing Authority judgment in the amount of $8,687.20 
and an order of restitution. Judgment, p. 2 (R. 296). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting Housing Authority an expedited trial in violation 
of Utah statute and Snyder's due process rights, since Housing Authority chose not to file 
a possession bond pursuant to Utah Code § 78-36-8.5 nor did defendant request an 
expedited hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY SCHEDULED 
AN EXPEDITED TRIAL IN THIS CASE 
A. Utah statutes do not establish any right to an expedited trial in 
unlawful detainer actions. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
establish a procedure for the scheduling of trials which applies to all civil cases in district 
courts. Rule 40(a), URCiv P, provides that cases will be placed upon the trial calendar 
upon a request of a party or by action of the court. The rule further provides that 
"[precedence shall be given to actions entitled thereto by statute." Thus, for example, 
hearings on requests for injunctions under URCivP, Rule 65A "shall be scheduled for 
hearing at the earliest possible time and take precedence over all other civil matters.../' 
No statute or rule provides for such priority trial setting for eviction actions. See Utah 
Code § 78-36-1 through § 78-36-12.6. 
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Furthermore, Rule 26, URCivP as amended in 1999, provides a clear procedure to 
be used in civil cases, beginning with a discovery and scheduling conference. While here 
defendant did not have counsel until April 21, 2000, placing this case outside the 
parameters of this rule pursuant to Rule 26 (a)(2)(A)(vi), once counsel appeared on behalf 
of defendant, this rule should have applied and a discovery and scheduling conference 
held. It was not. Plaintiff failed to fulfill its duty under the rules. 
Nor should the trial court have allowed this matter to go to trial in light of this 
rule and Snyder's objections to Housing Authority's request for trial setting based on a 
lack of opportunity to conduct discovery. This was error. 
In fact the Advisory Committee notes on changes to Rules 16(b) and 
26(a)(2)specify that: 
The scheduling and management conference is designed to encourage the parties 
and the court to take earlier and better control of the litigation. If possible, the trial 
date should be set at this conference as well as dates for all the necessary pretrial 
steps.... 
...The committee did not seek to exempt simple cases. The rule amendments 
benefit simple as well as complex litigation. 
Here a brief pretrial conference, the establishment of a compact discovery schedule and 
the setting of a trial date with input from all parties could have easily occurred, allowing 
for reasonable discovery by both Housing Authority and Snyder. Failure to comply with 
this rule was error. 
This same rule also assumes that a certificate of readiness for trial will accurately 
reflect the status of pretrial activities by the parties or one party will object. Here, the 
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certificate of readiness was filed on March 20, 2000 exactly one week after the answer 
was filed and before any discovery had occurred. Yet Housing Authority claimed in that 
document that 
* * * 
2. . . . opposing parties have had reasonable time to pursue discovery;. . . 
* * * 
4. That reasonable discussions to attempt settlement have been pursued by 
counsel and their clients, but no settlement has been effected. (R. 29-30). 
Neither statement was correct. 
Rule 16(b), which applies to unrepresented parties as well, allows but does not 
require a court to hold such a scheduling and management conference, and requires that 
"any party may and the plaintiff shall, at the close of all discovery, certify to the court 
that the case is ready for trial. The court shall schedule the trial as soon as mutually 
convenient to the court and parties...." (Emphasis added). Here it seems clear that 
discovery had not been completed, no settlement negotiations had occurred, a reasonable 
time to conduct discovery had not passed, and the date chosen by the court for trial was 
not convenient to Snyder since he had opposed the certificate and sought time to do 
discovery. Setting the trial here, under these circumstances, was error. 
Finally, the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides a bit of additional 
insight. Formerly Rule 4-104 set forth a procedure whereby a party could seek a special 
trial setting in matters of "exceptional urgency'' but this provision was repealed 
November 1, 1999, to coincide with the amendments to Rules 16 and 26 discussed above. 
There now is no longer such a special trial setting. 
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There is no formal discussion concerning objections to these certificates of 
readiness, but the fundamental policy reflected in the rules themselves and in the 
Advisory Committee note is one of cooperation between the parties and reasonable action 
by the court to assure that all parties have a reasonable opportunity for discovery before 
trial. The trial court's action in setting the trial in this matter so quickly that Snyder was 
denied the right to do discovery was error. The Code also establishes a procedure for the 
expedited disposition of motions, but does not do so for trial settings. See Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(4). 
Finally, Snyder sought to overturn the improper expedited setting by seeking a 
continuance, albeit at the last minute. While the decision to grant or deny such a request 
is clearly within the sound discretion of the trial court, Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1988), here the trial court abused its discretion. First, Housing Authority 
chose not to file a possession bond and initiate the alternative hearing procedure (see 
further discussion in Point B. below) and thus was in no position to complain about a 
continuance. Second, since rent was being paid into the court, Housing Authority was 
suffering no financial loss. (See Notice of tender/payment of rent in to registry of court. 
R. 138). Third, defendant was at a considerable disadvantage at trial, since he did not 
have the benefit of discovering the testimony of any of the five witnesses plaintiff called 
until they testified at trial. This violates Snyder's due process rights as well as 
constituting an abuse of discretion. 
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B. Housing Authority waived the opportunity for an expedited hearing by failing to 
post a possession bond. 
Recognizing that in many eviction cases the landlord seeks a quick proceeding to oust a 
tenant, the Utah Legislature adopted the possession bond procedure as an alternative 
procedure to the old forcible entry and detainer statute (Utah Code § 78-36-let seq.). This 
alternative procedure, set forth in Utah Code § 78-36-8.5 provides exactly what Housing 
Authority sought here: an expedited hearing. The problem, of course, is that here Housing 
Authority got what it wanted without having to follow the procedures that apply to all 
other landlords in the State of Utah and without posting a bond. 
The alternative procedure statute states: 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of 
final judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond.... 
The plaintiff shall notify the defendant that he has filed a possession bond. 
This notice shall... inform the defendant of all of the alternative remedies 
and procedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures 
applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under 
Subsection (1): ... 
[three choices are detailed: payment in full, execution of a counter-
bond or a hearing request] 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under 
Subsection (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, 
shall be granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the 
sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession 
of the property to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and 
if the court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession 
of the property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of 
the property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant 
to remain in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between 
the parties, the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required 
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in Subsection (2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues between 
the parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court 
shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
Utah Code § 78-36-8.5 
This procedure was adopted in 1981 to speed up evictions.1 The reason it was 
necessary was because the old statute simply did not provide for a speedy enough trial. 
Under the possession bond procedure, the landlord can force the tenant to request a 
hearing, which will be held "prior to the expiration of three days from the date the 
defendant is served with notice of filing of plaintiffs possession bond" (Utah Code § 78-
36-8.5 (2)(c).2 If the tenant does not request a hearing or make payment or post a 
counterbond within three days, an eviction order is issued. This is the legislature's 
expedited heaiing procedure, not unfairly jumping eviction cases ahead of other civil cases 
on the trial calendar and curtailing discovery. 
There was a time when many of the old Circuit Courts would routinely schedule eviction 
trials immediately after a defendant answered without requiring the landlord to follow the 
possession bond procedure. After this was brought to the attention of counsel for the 
Administrative Office of the Courts, that office issued a memorandum to court clerks 
advising them not to schedule expedited hearings unless the landlord posted a bond. That 
1
 See discussion in Utah Legal Services, Utah 
Landlord/Tenant Law Manual(1997) at V-12 through V-18. 
2
 This is generally impossible. See Utah Legal Services, 
Utah Landlord/Tenant Law Manual(1997) at V-16-18. 
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memo concluded that "[i]f the Legislature intended all eviction matters to receive 
expedited treatment, then the possession bond statute would be meaningless. " See R. 153, 
attachment). This memo made clear it did not prevent "expedited trials upon the court's 
motion" but pointed out that "such expediting must be done as the same circumstances as 
in other cases." (R. 153, attachment). This analysis has generally been followed 
throughout the state with the exception of a few courts which allow an expedited trial 
without posting the bond. This procedure, the one used here, directly contradicts the intent 
of the legislature and the analysis of the Administrative Office of the Courts. It is also bad 
policy. Granting an expedited hearing to Housing Authority without the posting of a bond 
here was error. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Amicus requests this Court remand this case for a new trial after defendant has had 
a reasonable chance for discovery and resolve the issue of expedited trial settings in 
eviction cases once and for all by declaring that, absent the posting of a possession bond, 
such cases are to be treated just like other civil cases with no special time priority, should 
be handled under the procedures of new Rules 16 and 26, and should allow for reasonable 
discovery before establishing a trial date. Further this Court should establish guidelines for 
trial judges to discourage the premature filing of certificates of readiness for trial and 
avoid setting trials based on such filings. 
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Respectfully submitted this 1 day of November, 2000. 
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